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OTHER LIMITATIONS ON TENTH AMENDMENT
RESTRICTIONS
RONALD D. ROTUNDA"
I. INTRoDuCTIoN
Before the middle of the 1970's, it appeared to be a settled princi-
ple of modern American constitutional law that the tenth amendment
failed to limit Congress's power under the commerce clause. In 1941,
the Supreme Court characterized the tenth amendment as a "truism",,
of little practical importance, concluding that "there is nothing in the
history of its adoption to suggest that it was more than declaratory of
the relationship between the national and state governments."2 This re-
strictive view echoed even earlier interpretations of the tenth amend-
ment as a mere constitutional redundancy' and was prophetic of the
Court's interpretation of federalism principles for nearly four decades.
Following Franklin D. Roosevelt's Court-packing proposal,4 the
Supreme Court began to acknowledge that the nation's economic and
social problems called for national solutions, and that the Constitution
did not forbid such a federal role. Congress responded by enacting a
plethora of federal legislation imposing significant obligations on the
states, "federalizing" the machinery of state government to serve the
ends of national policy. From 1937 until 1976, the Court consistently
rejected tenth amendment attacks on this congressional regulation of the
activities of state and local government entities when those challenges
t Professor of Law, University of Illinois. B.A. 1967, J.D. 1970, Harvard Uni-
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I United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 123-24 (1941).
2 Id. at 124. This historical assessment is illustrated by James Madison's attempt
in The Federalist Papers to calm the apprehension voiced by states' rights advocates
during the ratification debates that the states as political entities would be obliterated
by the powers of the federal government. THE FEDERALIST No. 45 (J. Madison).
3 As Chief Justice Marshall noted over 150 years ago, the tenth amendment had
been framed merely "for the purpose of quieting the excessive jealousies which had
been excited." McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 406 (1819).
1 For a discussion of the Court-packing plan, see L. BAKER, BACK TO BACK, THE
DUEL BETWEEN FDR AND THE SUPREME COURT (1967); R. JACKSON, THE STRUG-
GLE FOR JUDICIAL SUPREMACY (1941); Leuchtenberg, The Origins of Franklin D.
Roosevelt's "Court-Packing Plan," 1966 SUP. CT. REv. 347; Mason, Harlan Fiske
Stone and FDR's Court Plan, 61 YALE L.J. 791 (1952).
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were based on an asserted interest in state autonomy.5 The tenth
amendment, according to the Court, lacked a specific or enforceable
guarantee that might check the broadly interpreted federal commerce
power.' The Supreme Court engaged in simply pro forma review, with
toothless scrutiny of Congress's exercise of the commerce power.7 By
the mid-1970's, the tenth amendment was reduced to a mere expression
of sentiment whose time had passed. Then in June 1976, for the first
time since the Court-packing plan, the Supreme Court, in National
League of Cities v. Usery,8 used tenth amendment principles to invali-
s See, e.g., Fry v. United States, 421 U.S. 542, 548 (1975) (Court upholds the
Economic Stabilization Act of 1970 application of wage and salary freezes to state em-
ployees. Court rejects state sovereignty argument, stating that sovereign status does not
render states immune from federal regulation.); Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183
(1968) (Court upholds extension of the Fair Labor Standards Act to employees of state
hospitals, institutions, and schools. Extension subjected these employees to federal mini-
mum wage and hour requirements. Court dismisses argument that the tenth amend-
ment and principle of state sovereignty existed as a limitation on congressional power
under commerce clause.), overruled in National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S.
833 (1976); California v. Taylor, 353 U.S. 553 (1957) (Railway Labor Act requires
collective bargaining between a state and its civil servants working on state-owned rail-
roads because a state as well as a private person could disrupt commerce. Court not
receptive to state sovereignty claim.).
6 See, e.g., United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 123-24 (1941) (upholding ap-
plication of Fair Labor Standards Act to local manufacturing activities; "the [tenth]
amendment states but a truism") See generally J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG,
CONSTrrUTIONAL LAW 161-70 (2d ed. 1983).
1 For an example of the minimum scrutiny the Court gave to commerce power
cases after 1937, see Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146 (1971). In Perez a federal
statute, 18 U.S.C. §§ 891-896 (1976), which made "loansharking" a crime was applied
to petitioner, a "loanshark" in New York, who used threats of violence to collect $3000
he had loaned to a local butchershop. The Court affirmed the conviction, stating that
there was "a tie-in between local loansharks and interstate crime." 402 U.S. at 155. In
dissent, Justice Stewart stated that loansharking was no different from other local crime
and thus, the statute was beyond the power of Congress. He stated that "the definition
and prosecution of local, intrastate crime are reserved to the States under the Ninth and
Tenth Amendments." Id. at 158 (Stewart, J., dissenting). See also Katzenbach v. Mc-
Clung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964) (Tide II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as applied to a
restaurant receiving about $70,000 worth of food which had moved in commerce, was
held to be a valid exercise of the commerce power. Although Ollie's Barbecue had very
few, if any, interstate travellers as patrons, it was held to be subject to the Act because
discrimination causes a loss of black patronage. That loss of patronage results in less
food being sold which causes less food to move in interstate commerce. The Supreme
Court ignored the district court's finding that serving blacks at Ollie's would cause a
loss of business and thus less food would move in interstate commerce.); Hamm v. Rock
Hill, 379 U.S. 306 (1964) (Court applies Civil Rights Act of 1966 to vacate state
trespass convictions for lunch counter "sit-ins" by civil rights workers; the Court up-
held the law on commerce clause grounds and applied it to the state trespass convictions
rendered, but not finalized, prior to the law's passage. Justice Harlan said in dissent:
"[T]he legislative record is barren of any evidence showing that giving effect to past
state trespass convictions would result in placing any burden on present interstate com-
merce." 379 U.S. at 325 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted)).
8 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
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date an act of Congress, seemingly resurrecting a state sovereignty limi-
tation on the federal commerce power.
National League of Cities provoked scholarly commentary expres-
sing fears that the Court was reverting to its pre-1937 unprincipled
approach to the problem of the proper limitations on federal commerce
power." Yet, in the seven years since National League of Cities, no
Supreme Court opinion has used the tenth amendment to invalidate
federal legislation, and several subsequent cases have, in fact, severely
restricted the growth of the National League of Cities approach. This
paper explores these post-National League of Cities decisions, in par-
ticular, Federal Energy Regulatory Commission v. Mississippi,'0 and
concludes that although National League of Cities may still stalk the
night in prey of federal statutes to invalidate, its claws are dulled and
its size has much diminished.
II. THE REDISCOVERY OF THE TENTH AMENDMENT:
National League of Cities v. Usery
In National League of Cities v. Usery" the issue was whether the
commerce clause empowers Congress to regulate the states and their
political subdivisions in the area of employer-employee relations. Sev-
eral cities and states had brought suit against the Secretary of Labor,
challenging the validity of the 1974 amendments 2 to the Fair Labor
9 See, e.g., Cox, Federalism and Individual Rights under the Burger Court, 73
Nw. U.L. REv. 1, 22 (1978) ("[A]lthough the decision in National League of Cities is
almost surely consistent with the original conception of the federal union and might not
have surprised any constitutional scholar prior to the 1930's, it is thoroughly inconsis-
tent with the constitutional trends and decisions of the past forty years." Cox states
"that National League of Cities will come to be seen as no more than an unprincipled
exception to the general rule of federal supremacy."); Matsumoto, National League of
Cities-From Footnote to Holding-State Immunity from Commerce Clause Regula-
tion, 1977 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 35, 37, 89 ("The historical significance of the National
League of Cities decision can be appreciated when one notes that . . . the Court since
1937 has not used constitutionally-based federalistic limitations to invalidate an exercise
of congressional regulatory power." Matsumoto concludes by stating that "[w]hether
the Court is any better suited now than it was during the pre-1937 period to umpire
between congressional and state governmental interests . . . can only be judged by fu-
ture developments. However, the answer to that future issue ultimately may be found
in the past."); Schwartz, National League of Cities v. Usery-The Commerce Power
and State Sovereignty Redivivus, 46 FORDHAM L. REv. 1115, 1133-34 (1978) ("[Tihe
most disturbing aspect of the National League of Cities decision is the Court's gratui-
tous revival in it of the concept of state sovereignty." Schwartz goes on to state that
"[tihe evil that may be done by raising the ghost of state sovereignty may, however,
outlive the immediate decision of the Court.").
10 456 U.S. 742 (1982).
x' 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
'2 Fair Labor Standards Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-259, 88 Stat. 55
(codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (1976)).
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Standards Act"3 and seeking declaratory and injunctive relief from the
application of the Act's minimum wage, maximum hour, and overtime
provisions. The amendments extended those provisions to almost all
employees of public agencies.1 The cities and states contended that
when the Act was applied to state and municipal employees, as opposed
to private employees, it violated the tenth amendment.
Five members15 of a bitterly divided bench upheld the challenge,
overruled precedent,"' and asserted that to the extent the Fair Labor
amendments operated to "directly displace the States' freedom to struc-
ture integral operations in areas of traditional governmental functions,
they are not within the authority granted Congress by [the commerce
clause]." 1
Justice Rehnquist, for the majority, readily granted that the legis-
lation at issue was enacted pursuant to the plenary authority granted to
Congress under the commerce clause. He concluded, however, that, as
applied to "States qua States,"18 the legislation encountered the "con-
stitutional barrier"' 9 of state sovereignty:
We have repeatedly recognized that there are attributes to
sovereignty attaching to every state government which may
not be impaired by Congress, not because Congress may lack
an affirmative grant of legislative authority to reach the mat-
ter, but because the Constitution prohibits it from exercising
the authority in that manner.20
The Court concluded that a state's power to set the wages of its
is Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, ch. 676, 52 Stat. 1060 (codified as amended
at 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (1976)).
14 Fair Labor Standards Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-259, 88 Stat. 55
(codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (1976)).
15 Justice Rehnquist delivered the opinion of the Court, joined by Chief Justice
Burger and Justices Stewart, Blackmun, and Powell. Justice Brennan filed a dissenting
opinion in which Justices White and Marshall joined. Justice Stevens wrote a separate
dissenting opinion. Although he wrote a separate concurring opinion, Justice Blackmun
also joined the majority opinion. Several courts and commentators have erroneously
characterized the majority decision as a plurality opinion. See, e.g., United Transp.
Union v. Long Island R.R., 634 F.2d 19, 24 (2d Cir. 1980), rev'd, 455 U.S. 678
(1982).
16 426 U.S. at 855. The Court expressly overruled Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S.
183 (1968), in which the Court had upheld the 1966 amendments to the Fair Labor
Standards Act that extended the Act's coverage to include employees of state hospitals,
institutions, and schools.
17 426 U.S. at 852. Fire prevention, police protection, sanitation, protection of
public health, and maintenance of parks and recreation facilities were enumerated as
other examples of "traditional governmental functions." Id. at 851.
18 Id. at 847.
19 Id. at 841.
20 Id. at 845.
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employees was an "undoubted attribute of state sovereignty,""1 and that
the functions performed by affected state employees were "essential to
separate and independent existence" of the state.22 According to Justice
Rehnquist, by imposing wage and hour limits the statute could poten-
tially force reductions in state-provided public services, as well as se-
verely restrict the states' control over their employees. In short, "the
federal requirement directly supplants the considered policy choices of
the States' elected officials."2 s Such a direct interference with the states'
"essential decisions"'" and ability to "structure employer-employee re-
lationships"2 5 in areas involving "integral governmental functions"2
constituted a violation of the principles of federalism.
2 7
Justice Blackmun, joining the majority as the pivotal fifth vote,
also wrote a separate concurrence. He interpreted the majority opinion
as advocating a balancing approach in which the burden a federal regu-
lation imposes upon a state and the extent of interference with state
autonomy is weighed ad hoc against the magnitude of the federal inter-
est and the need for state compliance.28 He also voiced his understand-
ing, without further elaboration, that the decision would not "outlaw
federal power in areas such as environmental protection, where the fed-
eral interest is demonstrably greater and where state facility compliance
21 Id.
2 Id. (quoting Coyle v. Oklahoma, 221 U.S. 559, 580 (1911) (quoting Lane
County v. Oregon, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 71, 76 (1869))).
23 Id. at 848.
24 Id. at 855.
25 Id. at 851.
16 Id. See generally J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, supra note 6, at 170-
81. 8. Professor Tribe has argued that National League of Cities is best understood as
resting not on the tenth amendment, but rather on the desire of the Court to protect
individual rights to basic governmental (state-provided) services. L. TRmE, AMERICAN
CONSTrruTIONAL LAw § 5-22, at 308 n.9, 313 (1978); see also Tribe, Unraveling
National League of Cities: The New Federalism and Affirmative Rights to Essential
Government Services, 90 H. v. L. REv. 1065 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Tribe, Un-
raveling National League of Cities]. Professor (now Judge) Ruth Bader Ginsberg cor-
rectly calls this interpretation one of Tribe's "eyebrow raisers," and "extravagant."
Ginsberg, Book Review, 92 HARv. L. REv. 340, 342, 344 (1978). The only textual
support mentioned in Justice Rehnquist's opinion is the tenth amendment. See Na-
tional League of Cities, 426 U.S. at 842. Neither Justice Brennan, who dissented in
National League of Cities, nor Justice Rehnquist, who wrote the opinion of the Court,
intimated that the purpose or effect of the decision was to give individuals some kind of
constitutional right to demand state services.
Moreover, the Court itself has not hesitated to characterize National League of
Cities as a case resting on the tenth amendment. See Federal Energy Regulatory
Comm'n v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742, 758-71 (1982); id. at 778-79 (O'Connor, J.,
joined by Burger, -C.J., and Rehnquist, J., concurring in the judgment in part and
dissenting in part).
28 426 U.S. at 856 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
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with imposed federal standards would be essential." 9 Several lower
courts and commentators quickly adopted Blackmun's balancing ap-
proach as the correct interpretation of the decision."0
Justice Brennan, in a dissent joined by Justices White and Mar-
shall, vigorously attacked the fundamental basis of the majority opin-
ion. Echoing Wechsler's theory of political safeguards,3 1 Brennan as-
serted that the popularly elected branches are the only appropriate
forum for the resolution of such federalism questions. He caustically
termed the majority's attempt to protect state autonomy a "patent usur-
pation of the role reserved for the political process."32 Brennan's dis-
sent, characterizing the majority's tenth amendment analysis as "an ab-
straction without substance, founded neither in the words of the
Constitution, nor on precedent," ' condemned the majority for engaging
in unabashed policymaking and for exploiting their judicial robes by
manufacturing a lengthy legal argument merely as "a transparent cover
for invalidating a congressional judgment with which they disagree."3 4
The dissent also found insurmountable practical obstacles to the appli-
cation of the "traditional government functions" test Rehnquist had
enunciated. "[T]hat the test is unworkable," Brennan stated, "is
demonstrated by my Brethren's inability to articulate any meaningful
distinctions among state-operated railroads . . . state-operated schools
and hospitals, and state-operated police and fire departments."3 5
Justice Stevens apparently agreed that the "traditional governmen-
tal functions" test was unworkable. He wrote a separate dissent argu-
:9 Id.
S0 See, e.g., Woods v. Homes & Structures, Inc., 489 F. Supp. 1270, 1296-97 (D.
Kan. 1980) (balancing federal interest in requiring bond issues to comply with federal
antifraud provisions against local governments' power to issue bonds); Colorado v. Vet-
erans Admin., 430 F. Supp. 551, 559 (D. Colo. 1977) (federal interest in monitoring
veterans educational benefits program balanced against interference with state educa-
tional institutions), affd, 602 F.2d 926 (10th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1014
(1980); see also Barber, National League of Cities v. Usery: New Meaning for the
Tenth Amendment?, 1976 Sup. CT. REv. 161, 164 (National League of Cities "would
thus transport us from a regime which has sacrificed states' sovereignty for congres-
sional supremacy to a regime in which the Court will balance states' rights against
interests represented by Congress."); Note, Practical Federalism After National League
of Cities: A Proposal, 69 GEo. L.J. 773, 780 (1981) ("the majority's treatment of Fry
and Justice Blackmun's concurrence point to the conclusion that [National League of
Cities v.] Usery employs a balancing test that evaluates affected federal and state inter-
ests and examines the suitability of the chosen means to accomplish the federal end").
81 See Wechsler, The Political Safeguards of Federalism: The Role of the States in
the Composition and Selection of the National Government, 54 COLUM. L. Rxv. 543
(1954), cited in National League of Cities, 426 U.S. at 877 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
31 426 U.S. at 858 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
" Id. at 860.
3 Id. at 867.
5 Id. at 880.
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ing that he was "unable to identify a limitation on [the commerce
power] that would not also invalidate federal regulation of state activi-
ties that [he considered] unquestionably permissible."3
Brennan's dissent characterized the majority holding in National
League of Cities as a "portent . . . so ominous for our constitutional
jurisprudence as to leave one incredulous.13 7 Contemporary scholars of
constitutional law as well as members of the judiciary agreed, for Na-
tional League of Cities precipitated extraordinarily broad and severe
criticism and comment. 8
III. JUDICIAL LIMITATIONS ON National League of Cities v. Usery
PRIOR TO FERC v. Mississippi
The Court's resurrection of state sovereignty limitations on con-
gressional power spawned a controversy that some observers soon
thought to have been overrated.3 9 What many initially had perceived as
a radical departure from existing tenets of constitutional law was de-
scribed in one lower court's revisionist view of history as "a very care-
fully worded opinion on a very narrow issue." 40 Other cases have, with
more clarity, severely diminished the impact of National League of Cit-
ies v. Usery 1 by limiting its parameters and restricting its implications.
Id. at 881 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
37 Id. at 875 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
s See, e.g., Beaird & Ellington, A Commerce Power Seesaw: Balancing National
League of Cities, 11 GA. L. REv. 35 (1976); Choper, The Scope of National Power
Vis-a-Vis the States: The Dispensability ofJudicial Review, 86 YALE L.J. 1552 (1977);
Cox, Federalism and Individual Rights under the Burger Court, 73 Nw. U.L. REv. 1
(1978); Heldt, The Tenth Amendment Iceberg, 30 HASTINGS L.J. 1763 (1979);
Michelman, States' Rights and States' Roles: Permutations of "Sovereignty" in Na-
tional League of Cities v. Usery, 86 YALE L.J. 1165 (1977); Stewart, Pyramids of
Sacrifice? Problems of Federalism in Mandating State Implementation of National En-
vironmental Policy, 86 YALE L.J. 1196 (1977); Tribe, Unraveling National League of
Cities, supra note 27; Tushnet, The Dilemmas of Liberal Constitutionalism, 42 Omo
ST. L.J. 411, 420-21 (1981); Note, Practical Federalism After National League of
Cities: A Proposal, 69 GEo. L.J. 773 (1981); Note, supra note 30.
" See, e.g., Barber, supra note 30, at 165 ("The doctrine of League of Cities may
not survive."); Choper, supra note 38, at 1596-97 (National League of Cities v. Usery,
426 U.S. 833 (1976), "parallels the once greatly inflated, but now severely contracted
strictures on Congress's power to tax." (footnote omitted)); Cox, supra note 38, at 22
("National League of Cities will come to be seen as no more than an unprincipled
exception to the general rule of federal supremacy."); Note, Federal Securities Fraud
Liability and Municipal Issuers: Implications of National League of Cities v. Usery,
77 COLUM. L. Ruv. 1064, 1069 (1977) ("The Usery case . . . stands unequivocally
only for the rather vague proposition that there are some limits on federal power to
regulate the means by which states perform their traditional functions.").
4' EEOCw. Pennsylvania Liquor Control Bd., 503 F. Supp. 1051, 1053 (M.D.
Pa. 1980).
41 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
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A. Spending Power, War Powers, and the Power Under
Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment
On its own terms, National League of Cities applies only to stat-
utes enacted under Congress's commerce power. In a footnote the Court
cautioned, without explanation, that it expressed "no view as to
whether different results might obtain if Congress seeks to affect inte-
gral operations of state governments by exercising authority granted it
under sections of the Constitution such as the spending power, Art. I, §
8, cl. 1, or § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment."' 2 The majority further
limited its holding by stating that "[n]othing we say in this opinion
addresses the scope of Congress' authority under its war power.' 43
In light of these qualifications, National League of Cities has been
interpreted as an attempt to limit solely Congress's power under the
commerce clause. Many lower courts, subsequently faced with tenth
amendment challenges to federal legislation enacted pursuant to the
spending power, war powers, or the enabling clause of the fourteenth
amendment, have, therefore, announced that the National League of
Cities analysis is simply inapplicable. 4
Lower courts have recognized that the intrusive and exacting con-
ditions imposed by some federal spending programs offend the same
state interests purportedly protected by National League of Cities in
the commerce power context. Nonetheless, these courts have continued
to allow federal" interference with state sovereignty after National
League of Cities when the interference stems from Congress's exercise
of the spending power. In such cases, the state has a choice whether or
not to participate in federally funded programs, even if this "choice" is
often illusory because the federal "bribe" is so large. For example,
courts have permitted federal grant programs to dictate certain state
governmental structures as a condition for receiving financial aid, pro-
vided the grant program was "voluntary."' 5 There is no evidence that
41 Id. at 852 n.17.
43 Id. at 855 n.18.
44 See, e.g., New Hampshire Dep't of Employment Sec. v. Marshall, 616 F.2d
240, 247 (1st Cir.) (spending power), appeal dismissed, 449 U.S. 806 (1980); Walker
Field, Colo. Pub. Airport Auth. v. Adams, 606 F.2d 290, 297-98 (10th Cir. 1979)
(spending power); Jennings v. Illinois Office of Educ., 589 F.2d 935, 938 (7th Cir.)
(war powers), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 967 (1979); Marshall v. Delaware River & Bay
Auth., 471 F. Supp. 886, 891-92 (D. Del. 1979) (fourteenth amendment); North Caro-
lina ex rel. Morrow v. Califano, 445 F. Supp. 532, 536 n.10 (E.D.N.C. 1977) (spend-
ing power), affd mere., 435 U.S. 962 (1978); City of Philadelphia v. SEC, 434 F.
Supp. 281, 287-88 (E.D. Pa. 1977) (spending power), appeal dismissed, 434 U.S. 1003
(1978).
" See, e.g., Montgomery County v. Califano, 449 F. Supp. 1230 (D. Md. 1978),
affd mem., 599 F.2d 1048 (4th Cir. 1979); Florida Dep't of Health and Rehabilitative
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the Supreme Court would interfere with these post-National League of
Cities lower court decisions, and Bell v. New Jersey,48 a unanimous
1983 decision, reaffirms their rationale.
Bell held that the federal government may recover funds that were
misused after being advanced to a state as part of a federal grant-in-aid
program.47 Justice O'Connor, speaking for the Court, reasoned that re-
couping the money from the state does not violate the tenth amendment
because:
Requiring States to honor the obligations voluntarily as-
sumed as a condition of federal funding before recognizing
their ownership of funds simply does not intrude on their
sovereignty. The State chose to participate in the Title I
program and, as a condition of receiving the grant, freely
gave its assurances that it would abide by the conditions of
Title 1.48
The Court's consistent restraint and deference in cases involving
Congress's war powers also stand in contrast to the National League of
Cities approach to the commerce clause. The Court, even before it be-
gan exercising deference in the interstate commerce area, traditionally
had engaged in a deferential review of statutes enacted under the war
powers, including those directly affecting state governmental activities.
In the leading pre-National League of Cities decision of Case v.
Bowles, 9 the Court sustained an application of the Emergency Price
Control Act 50 to a sale of timber by the state of Washington, expressly
noting that the "only question is whether the State's power to make the
Servs. v. Califano, 449 F. Supp. 274 (N.D. Fla.), affd mem., 585 F.2d 150 (5th Cir.
1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 931 (1979); see also Comment, Toward New Safeguards
on Conditional Spendin: Implications of National League of Cities v. Usery, 26 AM.
U.L. REv. 726 (1977).
46 103 S. Ct. 2187 (1983).
47 Title I of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965 (ESEA), Pub.
L. No. 89-10, 79 Stat. 27 (codified as amended, 20 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2854 (Supp. V
1981)).
Title I created a program to improve educational opportunities for disadvantaged
children. Local educational agencies obtain federal grants through state educational
agencies, which, in turn, receive their grants from the Department of Education on the
assurance that the funds will be spent by the local agencies only on qualifying pro-
grams. Bell, 103 S. Ct. at 2189-90.
48 103 S. Ct. at 2197 (emphasis added). Federal Energy Regulatory Comm'n v.
Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742 (1982), in effect affirms and rationalizes the inapplicability
of National League of Cities to the spending clause, because the restrictions attached to
such federal grants are analogous to the conditional preemption in FERC. See infra
text accompanying notes 151-56.
4o 327 U.S. 92 (1946).
50 Emergency Price Control Act of 1942, ch. 26, 56 Stat. 23 (expired).
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sales must be in subordination to the power of Congress to fix maxi-
mum prices in order to carry on war." 51 The Court rejected the state's
claim of immunity because sustaining the state's position would imper-
missibly "impair a prime purpose of the Federal Government's estab-
lishment."52 Case came to stand for the proposition that the constitu-
tional grant of war powers is sufficient to sustain a statute that might
otherwise violate the tenth amendment.5"
The authority of Case was not affected by National League of
Cities. In a footnote to the majority opinion, Justice Rehnquist explic-
itly stated that Case was not being overruled and that nothing in Na-
tional League of Cities was intended to address the scope of congres-
sional prerbgatives under the war powers." Thus, subsequent lower
court cases, almost without exception,55 have held that the National
League of Cities test is inapplicable to a statute enacted under the war
powers.5"
The National League of Cities majority also expressly disclaimed
any intention to rule on the constitutionality of the exercise of congres-
sional power against the states pursuant to section 5 of the fourteenth
amendment.57 Over a century ago, the Court enunciated what has come
to be regarded as its traditional stance on that issue: "The prohibitions
of the Fourteenth Amendment are directed to the States, and they are
to a degree restrictions of State power. Such enforcement is no invasion
of State sovereignty." 5' Only four days after it decided National
League of Cities, the Court unanimously reaffirmed its adherence to
this line of analysis in Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer.59 In Fitzpatrick, the Court
upheld the validity of the 1972 extension of Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act6° to state and local government employees. Specifically, the
Court determined that the eleventh amendment and the principle of
state sovereignty it embodies are limited by the enforcement provision
51 327 U.S. at 102.
52 Id.
" Accord United States v. Oregon, 366 U.S. 643, 648-49 (1961).
" National League of Cities, 426 U.S. at 854 n.18.
55 One court has held National League of Cities' federalism policies must at least
be considered when the exercise of war powers interferes with state and local govern-
mental functions. Peel v. Florida Dep't of Transp., 600 F.2d 1070, 1083 (5th Cir.
1979).
58 See, e.g., Jennings v. Illinois Office of Educ., 589 F.2d 935, 938 (7th Cir.),
cert. denied, 441 U.S. 967 (1979); cf. United States Postal Serv. v. Brennan, 574 F.2d
712, 716 (2d Cir. 1978) (postal power), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1115 (1979).
5' 426 U.S. at 852 n.17, quoted supra text accompanying note 42.
Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339, 346-47 (1879).
a 427 U.S. 445 (1976).
Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-261, 86 Stat. 103
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980)).
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of the fourteenth amendment.61 Authoring this opinion, as he had Na-
tional League of Cities, Rehnquist reasoned:
In [§ 5] Congress is expressly granted authority to enforce
"by appropriate legislation" the substantive provisions of the
Fourteenth Amendment, which themselves embody signifi-
cant limitations on state authority. When Congress acts pur-
suant to § 5, not only is it exercising legislative authority
that is plenary within the terms of the constitutional grant, it
is exercising that authority under one section of a constitu-
tional amendment whose other sections by their own terms
embody limitations on state authority.62
Although Fitzpatrick dealt with the federal government's right to
infringe upon the state's rights protected by the eleventh amendment,
63
not the tenth, its message was clear: if federal legislation is properly
founded on section 5 of the fourteenth amendment, it may infringe on
attributes of state sovereignty protected by other constitutional amend-
ments which the fourteenth amendment, by its own terms, was meant
to affect.6
The Court reaffirmed this message in Milliken v. Bradley,"5 a
school desegregation case upholding a federal court's remedial order de-
spite its substantial impact on the state treasury. Relying on Fitzpat-
rick, the Court held that the "Tenth Amendment's reservation of
nondelegated powers to the States is not implicated by a federal-court
judgment enforcing the express prohibitions of unlawful state conduct
enacted by the Fourteenth Amendment."6 Later cases confirm this
principle.
67
62 427 U.S. at 456.
62 Id.
"8 The eleventh amendment provides that "[t]he judicial power of the United
States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or
prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another state, or by Citizens
or Subjects of any Foreign State." U.S. CONST. amend. X1.
Usery v. Charlestown County School Dist., 558 F.2d 1169 (4th Cir. 1977);
Usery v. Allegheny County Inst. Dist., 544 F.2d 148, 155 (3d Cir. 1976), cert. denied,
430 U.S. 946 (1977); EEOC v. Pennsylvania Liquor Control Bd., 503 F. Supp. 1051,
1053 (M.D. Pa. 1980); Marshall v. Delaware River & Bay Auth., 471 F. Supp. 886,
891-92 (D. Del. 1979).
65 433 U.S. 267 (1977).
66 Id. at 291.
6'7 See, e.g., Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 476 (1980) (Burger, C.J., an-
nounced the judgment of the Court in an opinion joined by White & Powell, JJ.)
(under the fourteenth amendment Congress can "regulate the procurement practices of
state and local grantees of federal funds"); cf. Rome v. United States, 446 U.S. 156,
179-80 (1980) (fifteenth amendment also overrides state sovereignty limitations).
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B. The Post-National League of Cities
Supreme Court Litigation
In addition to the express limitations on its holding in the Na-
tional League of Cities opinion itself, recent Supreme Court decisions
indicate the Court's desire to further cabin National League of Cities.
These cases severely restrict the reach of National League of Cities
even in situations where Congress has sought to reach intrastate activi-
ties under its commerce power. Although these cases suggest a general
retreat from the full breadth of National League of Cities, the two most
recent cases discussed below"8 may portend a return to sweeping Court
review of congressional actions under the commerce power.
1. Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining
and Reclamation Association, Inc.
The Supreme Court's first opportunity to clarify the implications
of its dramatic pronouncements in National League of Cities came as a
result of tenth amendment challenges to provisions of the Surface Min-
ing Control and Reclamation Act of 1977 (SMCRA). 9 Hodel v. Vir-
ginia Surface Mining and Reclamation Association, Inc.70 limited Na-
tional League of Cities by making clear that the tenth amendment does
not restrict Congress's power to preempt or displace state regulation of
private activity.
The SMCRA is a comprehensive statute designed to provide na-
tional performance standards for the coal mining industry in an effort
to protect the environment from the adverse effects of surface coal min-
ing operations without unduly discouraging coal production. The Act is
a detailed regulatory program promulgated to ensure that surface min-
ing is conducted with minimal disturbance to the landscape.7 ' The
SMCRA invites the states to submit their own reclamation plans for
approval by the Secretary of Interior;72 the Secretary, however, is em-
powered to promulgate and implement federal "plans" in those states
68 EEOC v. Wyoming, 103 S. Ct. 1054 (1983); Federal Energy Regulatory
Comm'n v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742 (1982); see infra text accompanying notes 115-
237.
" Pub. L. No. 95-87, 91 Stat. 445 (codified as amended at 30 U.S.C. §§ 1201-
1328 (Supp. V 1981)).
70 452 U.S. 264 (1981).
71 SMCRA § 102(d), 30 U.S.C. § 1202(d) (Supp. V 1981) ("It is the purpose of
this Act . . . (d) to assure that surface coal mining operations are so conducted as to
protect the environment.").
7 Id. § 503, 30 U.S.C. § 1253(a) (Supp. V 1981).
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electing not to formulate such programs on their own initiative."3 If the
states do not act, the federal government will.
74
The lower courts in Virginia Surface Mining and Reclamation
Association, Inc. v. Andrus75 and Indiana v. Andrus7" had found that
certain provisions of the SMCRA impermissibly preempted the state's
legislative discretion over areas of traditionally local concern in contra-
vention of the tenth amendment. In both cases, the district court had
relied extensively upon National League of Cities for its reasoning and
conclusion;77 the opinions are instructive as examples of how difficult it
is for lower courts to apply the vague tests and standards enunciated
there.
The courts first framed the issue as "whether the federal surface
mining act is directed to the state as a sovereign entity, displacing its
role as a decision-maker in areas of traditional governmental services,
or whether the act is directed to private activity. 71 8 The courts recog-
nized that the Act ultimately affected the coal mine operator, but held
that the law's pervasive effect was "on the states' legislative authority
and on state control of land within its boundaries.17 9 With the belief
that land use planning is indisputably a state activity, the courts care-
fully and painstakingly reviewed the litany of "tests" announced in Na-
tional League of Cities and held that the SMCRA deprived the states
of the power to decide how best to structure their own environmental
protection plans.80
In Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Association,
Inc.8" and Hodel v. Indiana"2 a unanimous Supreme Court reversed
738 The Secretary shall prepare and. . . promulgate and implement a Fed-
eral program for a State no later than thirty-four months after August 3,
1977, if such State-
(1) fails to submit a State program covering surface coal mining and
reclamation operations by the end of the eighteen-month period be-
ginning on August 3, 1977;
(2) fails to resubmit an acceptable State program within sixty days
of disapproval of a proposed State program ... ; or
(3) fails to implement, enforce, or maintain its approved State pro-
gram as provided for in this chapter.
Id. § 504(a), 30 U.S.C. § 1254(a) (Supp. V 1981).. Id. § 504(b), 30 U.S.C. § 1254(b) (Supp. V 1981) ("In the event that a State
has a State program for surface coal mining, and is not enforcing any part of such
program, the Secretary may provide for the Federal enforcement ... of that part of
the State program not being enforced by such State.").
11 483 F. Supp. 425 (W.D. Va. 1980), rev'd, 452 U.S. 264 (1981).
7' 501 F. Supp. 452 (S.D. Ind. 1980), rev'd, 452 U.S. 314 (1981).
7 See 483 F. Supp. at 431-35; 501 F. Supp. at 462, 464-65.
78 See 483 F. Supp. at 432.
79 Id.
80 Id. at 434.
81 452 U.S. 264 (1981).
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the district courts insofar as they had found portions of the SMCRA
unconstitutional and, for the first time since National League of Cities,
elaborated upon the tenth amendment limitation on Congress's exercise
of its commerce power.
First, the Court engaged in its traditional commerce clause analy-
sis. The justices found ample rational basis for Congress's determina-
tion that surface mining adversely affects commerce among the states.8 3
In addition, the Court found that the statute's challenged provisions
were reasonably related to the stated congressional purpose of control-
ling the adverse interstate economic and environmental effects of sur-
face coal mining. 4
Next, the Court noted that the lower court's heavy reliance on
National League of Cities' vaguely stated rationale resulted in "an un-
warranted extension of the decision in National League of Cities."8
Attempting to clarify the opaque standards and criteria discussed in
National League of Cities, Justice Marshall, writing for the Court, for-
mulated a three-pronged test for determining whether a federal statute
enacted pursuant to the commerce clause violates the tenth amendment:
First, there must be a showing that the challenged statute
regulates the "States as States." Second, the federal regula-
tion must address matters that are indisputably "attribute[s]
of state sovereignty." And third, it must be apparent that the
States' compliance with the federal law would directly im-
pair their ability "to structure integral operations in areas of
traditional governmental functions. '
Although the meaning of this test may be less than self-evident, in
applying this test the Court at least explained what regulating the
"States as States" meant. The Court rejected the tenth amendment
challenge in Hodel because the provisions at issue in SMCRA governed
directly only the activities of private individuals or businesses and not
states qua states.87 National League of Cities did not limit the power of
Congress to regulate private activities affecting interstate commerce,
82 452 U.S. 314 (1981). Hereinafter both Hodel v. Indiana and Hodel v. Virginia
Surface Mining & Reclamation Association, Inc. will be referred to collectively as Ho-
del. The Court in Hodel v. Indiana deferred to the decision in Virginia Surface Min-
ing on the tenth amendment and commerce clause challenges to SMCRA. See 452 U.S.
at 321-30.
8 Hodel, 452 U.S. at 281-82.
" Id. at 283.
85 Id. at 284.
8' Id. at 287-88 (quoting National League of Cities, 426 U.S. at 854, 845, 852
(1976)).
87 452 U.S. at 288.
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even if such federal regulation had the effect of displacing or preempt-.
ing state regulation of these activities. As Justice Marshall observed,
SMCRA does not directly coerce the states to enforce any standards, to
expend any funds, or "to participate in the federal regulatory programs
in any manner whatsoever.""8 It merely "establishes a program of co-
operative federalism that allows the States . . .to enact and to admin-
ister their own regulatory programs, structured to meet their own par-
ticular needs."819 Because the statute failed to satisfy the first prong of
Marshall's test, the Court did not even need to consider the second and
third elements of the test.
Significantly, the Court also cautioned that "[d]emonstrating that
these three requirements are met does not, however, guarantee that a
Tenth Amendment challenge to congressional commerce power action
will succeed." 90 Once a court finds that a statute satisfies all three
prongs of the Hodel test, it must further engage in a balancing of the
federal interest involved against the state's interest in retaining its sov-
ereignty: "the federal interest may be such that it justifies state submis-
sion. 9 Thus, Justice Marshall, in the Court's opinion in Hodel,
clearly adopted the balancing test that Justice Blackmun had advocated
in his concurrence in National League of Cities.
9 2
Finally, in response to the district court's finding that SMORA
displaces essential functions traditionally provided by the states, Justice
Marshall stated that Congress could, pursuant to the commerce clause,
decide to prohibit all state regulation of surface mining; "the
Supremacy Clause permits no other result." 8
Although Hodel's three-prong approach appeared to offer some
improvement over National League of Cities' vague criteria, it could
hardly be described as a litmus test for deciding federalism disputes.
Rehnquist's ambiguous phrases, the subject of so much previous criti-
cism, were adopted by Marshall verbatim. Although Marshall stated
them more succinctly, they nevertheless remained "an abstraction with-
out substance."'" It is hardly clear that any principled approach could
guide the judiciary in its construction of such ambiguous terms as
"traditional governmental functions," "integral operations," or "un-
doubted attribute of state sovereignty." Marshall simply quoted all
8 Id.
6, Id. at 289.
90 Id. at 288 n.29.
91 Id. (citations omitted).
" In fact, Marshall specifically cited Blackmun's concurrence. Id. (citing, inter
alia, National League of Cities, 426 U.S. at 856 (Blackmun, J., concurring)).
" Hodel, 452 U.S. at 290.
" National League of Cities, 426 U.S. at 860 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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these phrases from National League of Cities without elaboration.95
Moreover, Hodel's adoption of the balancing approach proposed
by Blackmun in National League of Cities as a "fourth" prong has
disquieting similarities to the pre-1937 Court's adjudication of com-
merce clause cases generally. The pre-1937 Court always "balanced"
in theory while engaging in unbridled policymaking in practice. When
that Court disagreed with the policy embodied in a federal statute, it
invalidated it and simply announced that the statute's effects on inter-
state commerce were too "indirect." '6 Like the vague and manipulative
test based on how direct the effect on commerce is, the "balancing test"
enunciated in Hodel may also be considered a tool for unprincipled
policymaking, providing after the fact justifications for arbitrary deci-
sions. After all, balancing is not really a test but is rather a label for ad
hoc decisionmaking unless the Court specifically enumerates what items
go on which side of the scale, how much weight each item is accorded,
and what principles of law are derived from the balancing.
Hodel's significance, however, is not its effort to add specificity to
the vague tests of National League of Cities, but its unmistakable, sym-
bolic message. It reaffirmed Congress's plenary power to regulate pri-
vate entities under the interstate commerce power and therefore to pre-
empt decisions of state and local governmental entities in order to
further national goals. At least, Hodel establishes that National League
of Cities is inapplicable when the federal government seeks to regulate
private activities even if the effect of such regulation is to displace state
regulation. Hodel, in short, restricts National League of Cities by hold-
ing that the tenth amendment does not limit "congressional power to
pre-empt or displace state regulation of private activities affecting in-
terstate commerce.
' 9
2. United Transportation Union v. Long Island Rail Road
Less than a year after Hodel, the Supreme Court further restricted
the scope of National League of Cities in United Transportation Union
v. Long Island Rail Road.98 Specifically, the Court granted certiorari
to decide whether the application to a state-owned railroad of Con-
gress's acknowledged authority generally to regulate labor relations in
the railroad industry would conflict with tenth amendment protections
'" Hodel, 452 U.S. at 286-87 (quoting National League of Cities, 426 U.S. at
854, 852, 852, 845).
See, e.g., Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935); Rail-
road Retirement Bd. v. Alton-R.R., 295 U.S. 330 (1935>.-
97 452 U.S. at 289-90 (emphasis added).
98 455 U.S. at 678 (1982).
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of state sovereignty as enunciated in National League of Cities.9
The Second Circuit had declared the federal Railway Labor Act
(RLA)100 unconstitutional as applied to employees of the Long Island
Rail Road (LIRR).1 °1 It held that the operation of the LIRR, an enter-
prise owned by the state of New York, was an integral state govern-
mental function °2 and that the terms of the RLA usurped state author-
ity over "essential governmental decisions."T.3 The court found that the
federal law impaired "the State's ability to structure employer-em-
ployee relationships in its role as sole provider of an essential public
service."'" Therefore, according to the court, the application of the fed-
eral statute to a state-owned railroad was inconsistent with the state
sovereignty doctrine articulated in National League of Cities.
The Second Circuit decision, reached before the Supreme Court's
clarification of National League of Cities in Hodel, underscores the de-
gree to which states could rely on the broad rhetoric of the National
League of Cities opinion to frustrate congressional exercise of the com-
merce power. Although dictum in National League of Cities supports
the validity of federal regulation of state-owned railroads, 0 5 the Second
Circuit reached the opposite result.
The Second Circuit interpreted National League of Cities as re-
quiring a two-tiered analysis under which a federal law would be un-
constitutional if (1) it regulated a state activity that was "an integral or
traditional government function," and (2) (following Blackmun's con-
currence in National League of Cities) the state's interest in the activity
outweighed the federal interest in regulating the activity. 06 Thus, the
Second Circuit initially had to determine "whether the operation of the
railroad qualifie[d] as an integral or traditional government func-
tion. 107 Finding that the operation of the state-owned railroad did so
qualify, the Second Circuit then balanced the federal interest in regu-
lating collective bargaining relations under the federal law against the
state's interest under the New York Taylor Law. 0 8 The court's ad hoc
9 Id. at 680.
100 Railway Labor Act, ch. 347, 44 Stat. 577 (1926) (codified as amended at 45
U.S.C. §§ 151-188 (1976 & Supp. V 1981)).
101 United Transp. Union v. Long Island R.R., 634 F.2d 19 (2d Cir. 1980),
rev'd, 455 U.S. 678 (1982).
102 Id. at 24-29.
103 Id. at 25.
104 Id. at 20.
105 National League of Cities, 426 U.S. at 854 n.18 (citing United States v. Cali-
fornia, 297 U.S. 175 (1936)).
206 Long Island R.R., 634 F.2d at 24.
107 Id. at 24-29.
109 N.Y. Civ. SERv. LAW § 206-214 (McKinney 1983).
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conclusion was that the state's interest in controlling the operation of its
railroad outweighed the federal interest in regulation of collective bar-
gaining relations.10 '
Applying National League of Cities and the three-pronged test of
Hodel, a unanimous Supreme Court reversed the Second Circuit and
held that the tenth amendment did not prohibit application of the Rail-
way Labor Act to a state-owned railroad engaged in interstate com-
merce.110 The Court focused on the third prong of the Hodel test
"which examines whether 'the States' compliance with the federal law
would directly impair their ability "to structure integral operations in
areas of traditional governmental functions." ' ""' The Court noted
that railroads had been subjected to comprehensive federal regulation of
their operations and labor relations for nearly a century and that there
was "no comparable history of longstanding state regulation of railroad
collective bargaining or of other aspects of the railroad industry.""1 2
Moreover, the Court recognized a strong federal interest in favor of a
uniform regulatory scheme governing railroad labor relations, conclud-
ing that such a scheme serves "to prevent disruptions in vital rail ser-
vice essential to the national economy."' The Court thus reaffirmed,
by way of holding, its earlier dictum in National League of Cities that
operation of a railroad in interstate commerce is not an integral govern-
mental activity: "Federal regulation of state-owned railroads simply
does not impair a state's ability to function as a state."11 4
IV. THE CONDITIONAL PREEMPTION DOCTRINE
AND THE DIVIDED COURT
A. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission v. Mississippi
If National League of Cities v. Usery 15 created "islands in the
stream of commerce""' 0 which are the exclusive province of the states,
then Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining and Reclamation Association 7
and United Transportation Union v. Long Island Rail Roada1 8 se-
109 Long Island R.R., 634 F.2d at 30.
110 455 U.S. 678 (1982).
"Il Id. at 684 (emphasis added) (quoting Hodel, 452 U.S. at 288 (quoting Na-
tional League of Cities, 426 U.S. at 852)).
112 Long Island R.R., 455 U.S. at 687-88.
I's Id. at 688.
114 Id. at 686.
115 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
226 Tribe, Federal-State Relations, in 4 J. CHOPER, Y. KAMISAR & L. TRIBE,
THE SUPREME COURT: TRENDS AND DEVELOPMENTS 1981-1982, at 164 (1983).
117 452 U.S. 264 (1981).
118 455 U.S. 678 (1982).
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verely eroded the banks of those islands. National League of Cities may
now stand for little more than the proposition that the federal govern-
ment cannot eliminate the states as entities, 1" set the wages of the gov-
ernor and other integral state employees who are not engaging in a
proprietary function, 20 or move the state capital.'2 Hodel and Long
Island Rail Road demonstrate that very few aspects of state sovereign
authority are immune from federal control. The next case in the post-
National League of Cities era, Federal Energy Regulatory Commission
v. Mississippi (FERC),'22 reinforces that proposition, although its bare
five-to-four majority suggests an uncertain future for tenth amendment
limitations on federal power.
In FERC the Court upheld the federal Public Utility Regulatory
Policies Act of 1978 (PURPA)"2 ' against a challenge that the Act im-
permissibly encroached on state sovereignty in violation of the federal-
ism principles announced in National League of Cities. PURPA was
enacted as part of a legislative package designed to combat the then-
perceived energy crisis plaguing the nation. 2 " PURPA, which governs
regulatory policies for electrical and gas utilities, requires state public
utility commissions to entertain various disputes under the federal regu-
lations"2 5 and to consider certain federal proposals in accordance with
federally dictated procedures.'26
In an unreported opinion, the District Court for the Southern Dis-
trict of Mississippi had held that PURPA was beyond the scope of
congressional commerce clause power.' 27 In addition, the court had re-
lied on National League of Cities in declaring that the statutory provi-
sions were void as constituting "a direct intrusion on integral and tradi-
tional functions of the State of Mississippi."' 28 The Supreme Court
unanimously reversed the lower court's holding with respect to the
commerce clause issue,' 29 but a divided Court only narrowly rejected
219 See Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183, 196 (1968), overruled in other respects,
National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
120 National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
121 Coyle v. Oklahoma, 221 U.S. 559 (1911).
122 456 U.S. 742 (1982). See generally Rotunda, Usery in the wake of Federal
Energy Regulatory Commission v. Mississippi, I CONST. COMMENTARY 901 (1984).
122 Pub. L. No. 95-617, 92 Stat. 3117 (1978) (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 15, 16, 30, 42 & 43 U.S.C.).
124 PURPA § 2, 16 U.S.C. § 2601 (1982).
125 Id. at § 210, 16 U.S.C. § 824a-3 (1982).
128 Id. at § 111, 16 U.S.C. § 2621 (1982).
127 456 U.S. at 752.
12 Id. at 753 (quoting Jurisdictional Statement, FERC, No. J79-0212(c) app. B
at 8a-9a (S.D. Miss. Feb. 27, 1981) (final judgment of Judge Cox, the trial judge)).
129 The majority, consisting of Justices Blackmun, Brennan, White, Marshall,
and Stevens, was joined on this issue by dissenting Justices Powell, Rehnquist, and
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the tenth amendment challenge.1 80
In an opinion written by Justice Blackmun, the Court easily con-
cluded that the district court had erred in ruling that intrastate regula-
tion of public utilities was not within Congress's plenary power over
interstate commerce, because Congress had made a specific finding that
"the regulated activities have an immediate effect on interstate com-
merce." ' In addition, Blackmun concluded that the legislative history
of PURPA supported Congress's conclusion that federal regulations of
natural gas and electricity retail sales, as well as a federal program for
the promotion of conservation and efficiency in the use of facilities and
resources by electric utilities, were necessary to ensure the continued
viability of interstate commerce and the national economy. 32
Blackmun then addressed the tenth amendment issue in three
parts, discussing each challenged provision of PURPA separately. He
first considered two aspects of section 210 of the Act: 38' (1) its preemp-
tion of certain state regulations, and (2) its enlistment of state authori-
ties to enforce federal standards. In order to advance the goal of reduc-
ing consumption of fossil fuels,13 section 210 of the Act encouraged the
development of cogenerators 35 and small power facilities 3" by pre-
empting conflicting state regulations.1 37 After Hodel, the five person
majority easily upheld this type of regulation. 3 ' Section 210 also re-
O'Connor, and Chief Justice Burger. See id. at 771 (Powell, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part); id. at 775 (O'Connor, J., joined by Burger, C.J., and Rehnquist, J.,
concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
130 Id. at 758-71.
131 456 U.S. at 755 (citing PURPA § 2, 16 U.S.C. § 2601 (1982) (congressional
findings)).
132 456 U.S. at 756-57.
133 16 U.S.C. § 824a-3 (1982).
134 456 U.S. at 750.
35 "A 'cogeneration facility' is one that produces both electric energy and steam
or some other form of useful energy, such as heat." Id. at 750 n.11.
is "A 'small power production facility' is one that has a production capacity of no
more than 80 megawatts and uses biomass, waste, or renewable resources (such as
wind, water, or solar energy) to produce electric power." Id.
137 Section 210(a) of PURPA directs FERC to promulgate regulations as are nec-
essary to promote cogeneration and small power production. 16 U.S.C. § 824a-3(a)
(1982). These regulations would preempt any conflicting state regulations. See Hodel v.
Virginia Surface Mining and Rel. Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264, 290 (1981) ("A wealth of
precedent attests to congressional authority to displace or pre-empt state laws regulat-
ing private activity aff&cting interstate commerce when these laws conflict with federal
law." The Court goes on to say "that the Commerce Clause empowers Congress to
prohibit all-and not just inconsistent-state regulation of such activities." The Court
concludes stating that "the Supremacy Clause permits no other result.") (citations
omitted).
138 456 U.S. at 759. Even Justice O'Connor, who was joined by Chief Justice
Burger and Justice Rehnquist dissenting as to most of the majority's tenth amendment
analysis, agreed that this preemption was constitutional. Id. at 775 n.1 (O'Connor, J.,
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quired state authorities to enforce standards promulgated by FERC to
promote cogeneration and small power production.1"9 The majority de-
scribed this requirement of section 210 as "more troublesome." 40 Nev-
ertheless, the majority sustained it as a permissible constitutional direc-
tive to the 'states.""' The Court reasoned that because Mississippi
authorities "customarily engaged in" such adjudicatory activity already,
section 210's requirement that state agencies implement and enforce
FERC rules could not be seen as imposing any additional burden. " "
Justice Blackmun found Testa v. Katt, M decided in 1947, "in-
structive and controlling on this point."1 44 He described Testa as hav-
ing made it clear that state courts were obliged, under the supremacy
clause, to hear and enforce a plaintiff's claim under federal law.14 5 The
federal statute in Testa provided for punitive damages and the state
court had refused to enforce it as a "penal" law of a "foreign" sover-
eign. 146 The United States Supreme Court reversed. The FERC major-
ity quoted Testa to demonstrate that, because of the supremacy clause,
"state courts do not bear the same relation to the United States that
they do to foreign countries." 14 7 The Court concluded that because of
this special relationship, section 210 was constitutionally permissible.
States have an obligation to enforce federal law. "Any other conclu-
sion," it noted, "would allow the States to disregard both the preemi-
nent position held by federal law throughout the Nation,. . . and the
congressional determination that the federal rights granted by PURPA
can appropriately be enforced through state adjudicatory
machinery."
14 8
Second, Blackmun turned to the provisions of titles I and III of
PURPA, which required the states to "consider" federal standards
dealing with rate structuring and other matters relating to the opera-
tion of electrical service.149 The majority noted that nothing in the rele-
dissenting in part).
13- PURPA § 210(0, 16 U.S.C. § 243a-3(f) (1982).
140 456 U.S. at 759.
141 Id. at 759-61.
142 Id. at 760.
143 330 U.S. 386 (1947).
144 456 U.S. at 760.
245 Id. at 760-61.
146 330 U.S. at 388.
124 Id. at 389, quoted in FERC, 456 U.S. at 763 n.28.
148 456 U.S. at 760-61 (citing Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304,
340-41 (1816)).
24. PURPA §§ 101-143, 301-311, 92 Stat. 3117, 3120-34, 3149-54 (codified at 15
U.S.C. §§ 3201-3211 (1982), 16 U.S.C. §§ 2603-2644 (1982), 42 U.S.C. §§ 6801-6808
(1976 & Supp. V 1981)). See, e.g., PURPA § 111, 16 U.S.C. § 2621 (1982) (requiring
each state regulatory authority to consider the use of six different approaches to struc-
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vant statutory provisions compelled the states to enact regulations, nor
did the Act mandate an agenda to which state decisionmakers must
scrupulously adhere.1 50 Rather, the federal law simply conditioned
"continued state involvement in a pre-emptible area on the considera-
tion of federal proposals."15 1 As in Hodel, the Court allowed Congress
to predicate continued state regulation in an area "on the condition"
1 52
that the states "consider proposed [federal] regulations."153 Congress, in
short, "may impose conditions on the State's regulation of private con-
duct in a pre-emptible area,""" and this proposition, not applicable to
National League of Cities, 55 allowed the Court to uphold PURPA
without overruling National League of Cities.
1 58
Third, Blackmun upheld those portions of titles I and III of
PURPA that required state commissions to follow certain notice and
comment procedures when acting on the proposed federal regula-
tions.157 The Court noted that the procedural requirements simply es-
tablished minimum due process guarantees already provided for by
state law. 58 Faced with the argument that the procedural requirements
could therefore be upheld as an exercise of Congress's powers under
section 5 of the fourteenth amendment to legislate commands to enforce
procedural due process guarantees, 59 the Court did not reach that issue
and instead opted to employ an analysis similar to that used in connec-
tion with the mandatory consideration provisions of titles I and 111.'60
The majority explained: "if Congress can require a state administrative
body to consider proposed regulations as a condition to its continued
involvement in a pre-emptible field-and we hold today that it
can-there is nothing unconstitutional about Congress' requiring cer-
tain procedural minima as that body goes about undertaking its
tasks.""'
turing rates, as well as mandating procedural requirements for their consideration).
250 456 U.S. at 769.
'15 Id. at 765 (emphasis added).
152 Id. (emphasis added).
a15 Id. at 771 (emphasis added).
15" Id. at 769 n.32.
155 Id. at 765-66; see infra text accompanying notes 167-68.
15 Justice O'Connor's dissenting opinion found no meaningful distinction be-
tween the statutes at issue in FERC and National League of Cities. See infra text
accompanying notes 167-68 for a more detailed discussion of the important distinctions
between the two cases.
157 456 U.S. at 770-71.
158 Id. at 770 & n.34.
15$ Id. at 770-71; see also J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, supra note 6,
at 832-41.
160 Id. at 771.
161 Id.; see also Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341, 344 nn.6-7 (1976) (the govern-
ment's power to create an interest carries with it the power over the procedures that
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What is troublesome about the FERC decision is that it was only
a five-to-four decision. Even more troubling are the grounds on which
the four justices dissented. The substance of the dissenting opinions in-
cludes theories and ideas which, if accepted, would result in the up-
rooting of piesent law and a return to much of the pre-1937 approach
to judicial review.
Justice O'Connor authored the principal dissent, concentrating on
the substantive holdings of the majority. Her conclusory statements,
reminiscent of the pre-1937 approach of the Court, fail to provide any
tests or guidance for future constitutional analysis.
With rhetorical flourish, Justice O'Connor accused the majority of
"conscript[ing] state utility commissions into the national bureaucratic
army, ' 162 of sanctioning the "dismemberment of state government,"163
of permitting Congress to "kidnap state utility commissions,
' 1 6 4 of
making state utility commissioners "bureaucratic puppets of the Fed-
eral Government," '65 and of transforming state legislative bodies into
"field offices of the national bureaucracy." 66
Although Justice O'Connor likened PURPA to the statutory pro-
visions at issue in National League of Cities,1 67 her analogy ignores the
crucial distinction between the two cases that proved so important to
Justice Blackmun. In the 1974 amendments to the Fair Labor Stan-
dards Act at issue in National League of Cities, Congress had not pro-
vided for conditional preemption: Congress simply told the states to pay
their employees above a minimum wage. The states were given no
choice. For example, although the federal government wanted the states
to pay their hospital workers a certain wage, the federal government
was not willing to take over-preempt-state hospitals to assure that
the hospital workers were well paid. 6 ' Although the federal govern-
ment promulgated the regulations, only the states bore the cost of com-
surround the interest); Arnett v. Kennedy 416 U.S. 134, 153-54 (1974); Board of Re-
gents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972).
162 456 U.S. at 775 (O'Connor, J., joined by Burger, C.J., and Rehnquist, J.,
concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
163 Id. at 782.
164 Id. at 790.
165 Id. at 783.
166 Id. at 777.
167 Id. at 781-82 & n.9.
168 Under the tenth amendment, Congress might not be able to take over the state
police. Even assuming, however, that such is the case, the argument in the text would
still apply to other state activities such as hospitals. Even as to state police, National
League of Cities left open the possibility of reaching such activities under the spending
clause. For example, Congress should be able to provide that state police paid in part
with federal funds must be paid the minimum wage.
312 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW
pliance. 6 9 The Court in National League of Cities in effect held that
this cost-free arrangement in favor of the federal government would
impermissibly burden the functioning of the state governments.
17 0
Thus, the federal government in National League of Cities, with-
out appropriating one federal dollar (even on a contingency basis), im-
posed a massive burden on the states. In FERC, on the other hand, the
states had a choice: consider certain federal standards or the federal
government will preempt the area. Therein lies the crucial distinction
between National League of Cities and FERC, the distinction that the
majority found dispositive."'7 In FERC the federal government was
willing to assume the substantial burdens preemption would impose on
it in order to achieve the desired result. If the states did not wish to
assume the new burdens imposed by the federal law, the states could
opt out. The federal government would then come in, preempt the
area-assuming the costs and burdens resulting from the regula-
tion-and achieve its desired results directly.
Put simply, the federal government in National League of Cities
told the states: "You pay the piper, but we'll call the tunes." In FERC
the federal government said to the states: "You pay the piper and you
call the tunes. We would like you to call certain tunes. If you refuse,
then we will pay the piper and call the tunes."
If the federal government is willing to assume the full burdens of
direct regulation it will not impose regulations without carefully con-
sidering the costs involved. 17' The self-restraint imposed by the federal
decisionmaking structure in FERC lessens the need for the type of ac-
tive review in which the Court engaged in National League of Cities.
As Justice Stone stated, in a slightly different context:
[T]he thought, often expressed in judicial opinion, [is] that
when the regulation is of such a character that its burden
falls principally upon those without the state, legislative ac-
tion is not likely to be subjected to those political restraints
which are normally exerted on legislation where it affects
adversely some interests within the state.' 73
10 See National League of Cities, 426 U.S. at 846-48.
170 See id. at 846-52.
17 See supra notes 155-56 and accompanying text.
172 J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, supra note 6, at 276-77; see also
United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938); South Carolina
State Highway Dep't v. Barnwell Bros., Inc., 303 U.S. 177, 184-85 n.2 (1938).
17" South Carolina State Highway Dep't v. Barnwell Bros., Inc., 303 US. 177,
185 n.2 (1938). See also United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4
(1938) (Stone, J.). See generally J. CHOPER, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE NATIONAL
POLITICAL PROCESS (1980).
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Justice Stone used this argument to justify active Supreme Court re-
view of state laws affecting interstate commerce as well as active review
of state or federal laws restricting the Bill of Rights or burdening mi-
norities. However, Stone recognized that this same rationale dictates a
more restrained Supreme Court review of federal laws based on the
commerce power." 4 Such is the case in FERC. Conditional preemption
provides a structural check on congressional decisionmaking which les-
sens the need for judicial activism.
Justice O'Connor's argument ignored this distinction between
FERC and National League of Cities and instead questioned the ac-
ceptability of conditional preemption itself. Although O'Connor ac-
knowledged that Congress can completely preempt the states in regula-
tion of private conduct,17 5 she did not believe that Congress could
conditionally preempt state regulation."' 6 She contended that Congress
could not condition the validity of state enactments in a preemptible
area on state conformity with federal standards. Such conditioning, she
believed, would "coerce" the states into passing whatever legislation
Congress might deem desirable.
177
Justice O'Connor's argument, if accepted, would greatly expand
the scope of the decision in National League of Cities. It would apply
with equal force to the spending clause cases, which also involve a con-
ditional exercise of federal power.7' Yet in the spending clause context,
174 See United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152-54 (1938). In
Carolene Prods. Justice Stone noted that federal "regulatory legislation affecting ordi-
nary commercial transactions is not to be pronounced unconstitutional unless in the
light of the facts made known or generally assumed it is of such a character as to
preclude the assumption that it rests upon some rational basis within the knowledge
and experience of the legislators." Id. at 152. Stone added that where congressional
judgment is drawn into question, "the inquiry must be restricted to the issue whether
any state of facts either known or which could reasonably be assumed, affords support
for it." Id. at 154.
175 FERC, 456 U.S. at 775 n.1 (O'Connor, J., dissenting in part).
176 Id. at 781-87.
177 Id. at 785-91. The due process clause doctrine of unconstitutional conditions
does not shield states from such coercion because states are not "persons" for purposes
of the due process clause of the fifth amendment. South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383
U.S. 301, 323-24 (1966).
178 In Steward Machine Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548 (1937), the Court sustained
the unemployment compensation provisions of the Social Security Act. Congress had
given the states a choice-either they could pass their own unemployment compensation
programs, which had to meet federal standards, or the federal government would devise
a program for them, preempting the area. The states were induced to form their own
plans, instead of abandoning the area, through a provision of the tax imposed by title
IX of the Social Security Act, which allowed the taxpayer a 90% credit against the
federal tax for contributions made under a state unemployment law, provided that the
state program met federal standards. The majority held that this "tax and credit" plan
did not coerce the state and that no undue influence had been exerted by the national
government on the state. See also Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 474 (1980)
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the Court, even before 1937, consistently has recognized that federal
grants may be designed to induce the states to comply with federal
policy.179
Justice O'Connor objected that conditional preemption under the
commerce clause "blurs the lines of political accountability."180 Yet,
this "blurring" has not been regarded as justification for overturning
the spending clause cases, cases with which O'Connor seems to agree.
In 1983, in fact, Justice O'Connor wrote an opinion for a unanimous
Court, which, in effect, accepted the rationale of conditional preemp-
tion. Bell v. New Jersey 181 holds that if a state misuses funds advanced
as part of a federal grant-in-aid program the federal government may
recover those misused funds. The Court's reasoning in reaching this
conclusion is significant:
Requiring States to honor the obligations voluntarily as-
sumed as a condition of their ownership of funds simply does
not intrude on their sovereignty. The State chose to partici-
pate in the Title I program and, as a condition of receiving
the grant, freely gave its assurances that it would abide by
the conditions of Title 1.182
Justice O'Connor's use of such language in upholding the conditional
exercise of federal power in the spending clause context tacitly adopts
the rationale of conditional preemption which she had criticized in her
discussion of the relationship between the tenth amendment and the
commerce clause in FERC.
Finally, Justice O'Connor's discussion of the application of the
Hodel test'88 to the FERC case exemplifies the dissent's focus on con-
clusory statements in place of helpful tests or explanations. For exam-
ple, Justice O'Connor stated that "plainly [titles I and III of PURPA]
("Congress has frequently employed the Spending Power to further broad policy objec-
tives by conditioning receipt of federal moneys upon compliance. . . with federal stat-
utory and administrative directives. This Court has repeatedly upheld. . . the use of
this technique to induce governments and private parties to cooperate voluntarily with
federal policy."); Oklahoma v. United States Civil Serv. Comm'n, 330 U.S. 127 (1947)
(Federal highway funds could be conditioned on state's compliance with a provision of
the Hatch Act. The state could remove the State Highway Commissioner who was also
state chairman of the Democratic party or risk a cutoff of highway grants.).
179 See Oklahoma v. United States Civil Serv. Comm'n, 330 U.S. 127 (1947). See
generally P. HAY & R. ROTUNDA, THE UNITED STATES FEDERAL SYSTEM: LEGAL
INTEGRATION IN THE AMERICAN EXPERIENCE 169-84 (1982).
180 FERC, 426 U.S. at 787 (O'Connor, J., dissenting in part).
181 103 S. Ct. 2187 (1983). See supra text accompanying notes 46-48.
182 103 S. Ct. at 2197.
188 See supra text accompanying notes 85-92.
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regulate the 'States as States.' "' That conclusory statement, however,
hardly provides a litmus test. The statute struck down in National
League of Cities is directed against the states in the same way that the
statute upheld in Bell v. New Jersey regulates the states as states: both
require the states to spend money in a particular way or to refrain from
spending money at all.
In order to satisfy the second prong of Hodel concerning "attrib-
utes of state sovereignty," O'Connor analogizes the situation in FERC
to a congressional requirement that "state legislatures . . . debate bills
drafted by congressional committees."' 5 That analogy, however, ig-
nores the fact that FERC involves a state administrative agency, not a
state legislature. Although Congress could not outlaw state legislatures,
it could in effect outlaw state agencies regulating utilities by completely
preempting the field. O'Connor attempts to dispose of the third prong
in Hodel by simply announcing that "utility regulation is a traditional
function of state government." ' 6 Although Justice O'Connor candidly
admits that the "Court has not fully explored the extent of 'traditional'
state functions, 187 she then flatly asserts, without analysis, that
"[u]tility regulation . . . should fall within any definition of that
term."188 The long history of federal regulation of utilities 89 is conve-
niently ignored.
Finally, O'Connor fails to address the exception, mentioned in Ho-
del, of a federal interest so strong that it requires state submission de-
spite satisfaction of all three prongs of the Hodel test.190 The FERC
majority, finding that the three prongs of the Hodel test were not satis-
fied, did not have to reach this issue. Given O'Connor's conclusion,
however, her dissent should have explained why the exception was in-
applicable on the facts of FERC.91 Does such silence imply that the
18" FERC, 456 U.S. at 778-79 (O'Connor, J., dissenting in part).
185 Id. at 780.
186 Id. at 781.
187 Id. at 781 n.7.
1" Id.
180 Such regulation includes tax subsidies, restrictions on business entry, antitrust
policy, direct regulation of oil and gas prices, tariff and import and export restrictions,
and energy allocation regulations. See generally T. MORGAN, CASES AND MATERIALS
ON ECONOMIC REGULATION OF BUSINESS (1976); W. RODGERS, JR., CASES AND
MATERIALS ON ENERGY AND NATURAL RESOURCES LAW (1979); H. WILLIAms, R.
MAXWELL, & C. MEYERS, CASES AND MATERIALS ON THE LAW OF OIL AND GAS
(1974); Posner, Natural Monopoly and Its Regulation, 21 STAN. L. REv. 548 (1969).
190 Hodel, 452 U.S. at 288 n.29; see supra text accompanying notes 90-92.
11 Justice O'Connor does, in fact, recognize the exception, noting that both Hodel
and Long Island R.R. adopted it. 456 U.S. at 778 n.4 (O'Connor, J., dissenting in
part). She concludes, however, that "[nieither of these cases involved such an exception
to National League of Cities and the Court has not yet explored the circumstances that
might justify such an exception." Id. Certainly if she believed that the three prongs of
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dissent believed, as a matter of law, that there is no strong federal in-
terest in energy policy? Such a view would lead to the implausible con-
clusion that Congress could not even "rationally" find a national en-
ergy problem to exist.
On a broader and more troubling note, the dissent resembles the
Court's pre-1937 approach to judicial review of federal regulations:
lengthy discussion of policy and little discussion of principles of consti-
tutional adjudication. If accepted, the dissent's approach would result in
certain areas being immune from federal regulation simply because five
justices have labelled them to be "traditionally reserved to state
authority.
1 92
In a partial dissent, Justice Powell also expressed disagreement
with the FERC majority's tenth amendment analysis. Although he de-
scribed Justice O'Connor's dissenting opinion as "abl[e]" 1 93 and ap-
plauded "the appeal-and indeed wisdom-of Justice O'Connor's evo-
cation of the principles of federalism,"' ' he concluded that the dissent's
attacks on the constitutionality of the substantive provisions of PURPA
were foreclosed by precedent."9 5 Nevertheless, Powell disagreed with
the majority's conclusion regarding the procedural requirements of ti-
tles I and III. Powell rejected what he termed the majority's "threat of
preemption" reasoning 96 and warned that "[i]f Congress may do this,
presumably it has the power to pre-empt state-court rules of civil pro-
cedure and judicial review in classes of cases found to affect
commerce."
19 7
Powell's reasoning fails to account for both longstanding precedent
and the enabling provision of the fourteenth amendment. At best, he
ignores section 5 of the fourteenth amendment which grants to Con-
gress the power "to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of
this article," ' 91 including the due process clause. The notice and com-
ment procedures mandated by PURPA can be viewed as simply estab-
lishing minimum due process requirements for hearings conducted by
state utility commissions. Viewed in such a light, the procedural re-
quirements, if nothing else, should be a valid exercise of Congress's
power to enforce due process guarantees under the fourteenth amend-
ment. Implicit, therefore, in Powell's opinion is the contention that
the Hodel test were satisfied in FERC then the time was ripe for her to go exploring.
2" FERC, 456 U.S. at 783 (O'Connor, J., dissenting in part).
193 456 U.S. at 771 (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
194 Id. at 775.
195 Id. (citing Hodel and Testa).
'" Id. at 773.
'9 Id. at 774.
198 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5; see supra text accompanying notes 157-60.
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Congress violates the tenth amendment if it compels states to enforce
procedural due process (that is, rights to a hearing and notice) under
the fourteenth amendment. It would appear that he is suggesting that
the protections for states embodied in the tenth amendment limit the
efficacy of the powers granted to Congress by the fourteenth amend-
ment. Contrary to that suggestion, the purpose of the fourteenth
amendment, which was enacted nearly three-quarters of a century after
the tenth, was to limit state action and the powers of states under the
tenth amendment, not vice versa.
To support his procedural argument, Powell cited Professor
Henry Hart for the proposition that "'federal law takes state courts as
it finds them.' "" Hart did indeed make such a statement in 1954, but
he noted that it was only the "general rule," and he also explained that
the state rules must "not [be] so rigorous- as, in effect, to nullify the
asserted rights."2 °0 Hart fully supported the case law which holds that
states must provide a hospitable forum for the assertion of federal
rights.2 " . The federal government has every right to expect that the
states will fairly consider its proposals. Thus, Congress provided for
basic procedural protections in PURPA to be sure that inadequate state
procedures did not nullify federal rights.
The cases under the Federal Employers' Liability Act (FELA)
202
are an old line of authority establishing that Congress does have the
power to regulate state procedure in order to protect federal interests.
For example, the Court has held that the seventh amendment, which
guarantees a jury trial in a civil case in federal court, is inapplicable to
a civil case brought in state court.203 Nonetheless, a state court hearing
a FELA case cannot circumvent a litigant's federal right to a jury trial
guaranteed by FELA, even though state law would have required that
certain issues be decided by the judge rather than the jury-were it not
for the federal act.20' In other words, a FELA plaintiff can choose a
state forum but still have the benefit of certain federal procedures.
FELA also provides for a damage action by a railroad employee
against his or her employer for occupational injuries caused by the neg-
119 456 U.S. at 774 (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (quot-
ing Hart, The Relations Between State and Federal Law, 54 COLUM. L. Rav. 489,
508 (1954)).
100 Hart, supra note 199, at 508.
201 See Williams v. Georgia, 349 U.S. 375, 399 (1955) (Clark, J., dissenting); see
also Hart, The Time Chart of the Justices, 73 HARv. L. Rv. 84, 116 (1959).
202 45 U.S.C. §§ 51-60 (1976).
201 Minneapolis & St. L. R.R. v. Bombolis, 241 U.S. 211 (1916).
204 Dice v. Akron, C. & Y.R.R., 342 U.S. 359, 362-64 (1952).
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ligence of the railroad20 5 and allows for a survivor's action in the event
that negligence results in the employee's death.20 ' Thus, FELA pre-
empted state common and statutory law in interstate railroad em-
ployer's negligence cases. 07 State courts hearing such cases must not
only apply federal substantive law but also federal procedural guaran-
tees when those procedures are found by Congress to be a substantial
part of the rights accorded by FELA.20 8 One such procedural guarantee
is the right to a jury trial; thus, Court decisions after the 1939 amend-
ments209 to FELA "teach that the Congress vested the power of deci-
sion in these actions exclusively in the jury in all but the infrequent
cases."
2 10
The FELA cases demonstrate that Congress can dictate certain
procedural requirements for federal civil cases brought in state court.
Congress is able to mandate these procedures in order to ensure that
the federal interest in providing a cause of action for certain injured
workers is protected. If Congress can mandate such procedures in order
to affect the substantive outcome of a case brought in a state trial court,
it should be able to mandate similar procedures in proceedings brought
before state agencies.
Curiously, Justice Powell failed to mention the FELA precedents
and the role of conditional preemption, just as he ignored the implica-
tions of section 5 of the fourteenth amendment. Acceptance of his opin-
ion, therefore, would result in the rejection of longstanding precedent as
well as adoption of an illogical interpretation of the Constitution.
205 45 U.S.C. § 51 (1976). See, e.g., Chambers v. Chicago, B. & Q.R., 138 Neb.
490, 490, 293 N.W. 338, 339 (1940). In Chambers the court states that:
Liability imposed by the Federal Employers' Liability Act is liability for
negligence of common carrier for damages to any person suffering injury
while in the employ of such carrier in commerce between states, resulting,
in whole or in part, from the negligence of the officers, agents, or employ-
ees of such carrier.
Id. (syllabus by the court).
20- 45 U.S.C. § 59 (1976). See, e.g., Washington Ry. & Elec. v. Scala, 244 U.S.
630, 638-40 (1917) (Affirming a lower court ruling against the railroad, the Supreme
Court allowed plaintiff's decedent damages for pain and suffering of deceased. Court
held that plaintiff stated a case of negligence plainly within the terms of the Federal
Employers' Liability Act and made a valid claim for the death of deceased from injuries
which caused him to "suffer intense pain.").
207 South Buffalo Ry. v. Ahern, 344 U.S. 367 (1953).
20 See, e.g., Dice v. Akron, C. & Y.R.R., 342 U.S. 359, 363 (1952) (jury trial).
209 Act of Aug. 11, 1939, ch. 685, 53 Stat. 1404 (codified as amended at 45 U.S.C.
§§ 51-60 (1976)).
210 Rogers v. Missouri Pac. R.R., 352 U.S. 500, 510 (1957) (footnote omitted).
See also Baltimore & O.R.R. v. Davis, 379 U.S. 671 (1965); Dennis v. Denver & Rio
Grande W.R.R., 375 U.S. 208 (1963); Basham v. Pennsylvania R.R., 372 U.S. 699
(1963); Brown v. Western Ry., 338 U.S. 294 (1949) (state rule regarding particularity
in pleadings cannot be used to defeat FELA liability).
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B. EEOC v. Wyoming
The Court's most recent opportunity to refine National League of
Cities was its decision in EEOC v. Wyoming.2 In that case, the trial
court invalidated the extension of the Age Discrimination in Employ-
ment Act (ADEA) 212 to employees of state and local governments, spe-
cifically Wyoming game and fish wardens.2"' The ADEA forbids dis-
crimination against any potential or present employee between 40 and
70 years old on the basis of age, unless "age is a bona fide occupational
qualification reasonably necessary to the normal operation of the par-
ticular business, or where the differentiation is based on factors other
than age."2 4 In the trial court, Wyoming had successfully argued that
its mandatory retirement age of 55 was necessary to assure the physical
preparedness of its game wardens." 5 The Supreme Court, in another
five-to-four opinion,2' 6 reversed and held that the commerce power jus-
tified the extension of the federal Act.217
Justice Brennan, who had dissented in National League of Cities,
wrote the majority opinion. He readily conceded that the federal law
prohibiting discrimination in employment based on age did regulate the
"States as States," the first part of the three-part Hodel test, but then
he noted, by way of footnote, that this prong of the Hodel test marks
National League of Cities as "a specialized immunity doctrine rather
than a broad limitation on federal authority." '18
The majority had "significantly more difficulties"21 9 with the sec-
ond prong of the Hodel test-the determination whether the statute af-
fected an "undoubted attribute of state sovereignty" 220-because, the
Court candidly admitted, "[p]recisely what is meant by an 'undoubted
attribute of state sovereignty' is somewhat unclear . . . and our subse-
211 103 S. Ct. 1054 (1983).
2 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
218 EEOC v. Wyoming, 514 F. Supp. 595 (D. Wyo. 1981), rev'd., 103 S. Ct.
1054 (1983).
2"' Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 § 4(0(1), 29 U.S.C. §
623(0(1) (1976).
215 EEOC v. Wyoming, 103 S. Ct. at 1062.
"16 Chief Justice Burger, joined by Justices Powell, Rehnquist, and O'Connor dis-
sented. Id. at 1068. Justice Stevens joined the Court's opinion, but also wrote a sepa-
rate concurrence arguing that National League of Cities should be overruled. Id. at
1064.
2117 Id. at 1064 (opinion of the Court). The Court did not find it necessary to
reach the question of Congress's power under section 5 of the fourteenth amendment,
but noted that the constitutionality of congressional action need not depend on Con-
gress's recitals of the origins of the p3wer. Id. at n.18.
218 Id. at 1061 n.10.
219 Id. at 1061 n.11.
'"0 National League of Cities, 426 U.S. at 845.
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quent cases applying the National League of Cities test have had little
occasion to amplify on our understanding of the concept." '221 The Court
did not need to apply or explore the meaning of this amorphous con-
cept, however, because it concluded that the ADEA did not meet the
third prong of the Hodel test: it did not "'directly impair' the State's
ability to 'structure integral operations in areas of traditional govern-
mental functions.' ",222
In reaching this conclusion, Justice Brennan reasoned that, under
the federal law, Wyoming could meet its goal of physical preparedness
simply by proceeding in a more individualized manner and only dis-
missing those wardens who are insufficiently fit. s Alternatively, it
could keep its present policy by demonstrating that age is a bona fide
occupational qualification for the job.22' Finally, the majority could
find no reason to conclude that the federal law at issue would have any
"wide-ranging and profound threat to the structure of State
governance." 2 5
In National League of Cities the Court had concluded that impos-
ing the federal minimum wage on state workers would significantly af-
fect state budgeting decisions regarding vital programs. The EEOC v.
Wyoming Court held that the analysis of the impact of federal law on
the state budgetary process is not an empirical study. Rather, it is a
"generalized inquiry, essentially legal rather than factual, into the di-
rect and obvious effect of the federal legislation on the ability of the
States to allocate their resources." 226 Applying this standard, the Court
found that the ADEA would not have results similar to the statute in
National League of Cities:
In this case, we cannot conclude from the nature of the
ADEA that it will have either a direct or an obvious nega-
tive effect on state finances. Older workers with seniority
may tend to get paid more than younger workers without
seniority, and may by their continued employment accrue in-
creased benefits when they do retire. But these increased
costs, even if they were not largely speculative in their own
right, might very well be outweighed by a number of other
factors: Those same older workers, as long as they remain
employed, will not have to be paid any pension benefits at
221 EEOC v. Wyoming, 103 S. Ct. at 1061 n.11.
222 Id. at 1061-62.
21s Id.
22 Id.
225 Id.
226 Id. at 1063.
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all, and will continue to contribute to the pension fund. And,
when they do retire, they will likely, as an actuarial matter,
receive benefits for fewer years than workers who retire
early.22
7
The same four justices who had dissented in FERC also dissented
in EEOC v. Wyoming.2 28 Chief Justice Burger authored the opinion
which argued that the ADEA violated the principles enunciated in Na-
tional League of Cities and refined in Hodel.229 Burger dismissed the
conclusions of the majority230 that Wyoming, without undue burden,
could pursue its goals without a mandatory retirement age231 and that
the bona fide occupational qualification defense provided the state with
a meaningful alternative.2 2 Burger then addressed the "fourth" prong
of Hodel: the balancing advocated by Justice Blackmun in his National
League of Cities concurrence. Describing the federal interests involved
in EEOC v. Wyoming as "largely theoretical" and the state interests
involved as "real," the Chief Justice asserted that the "Commerce
Clause powers are wholly insufficient to bar the states from dealing
with or preventing these [real] dangers in a rational manner."'2 "
Burger then turned to the question whether the ADEA could be
upheld as an exercise of Congress's power under section 5 of the four-
teenth amendment. He did not believe that section 5 could justify the
application of the ADEA in EEOC v. Wyoming, an issue the majority
did not need to reach.2 ' He also found it important that there is "no
hint in the body of the Constitution ratified in 1789 or in the relevant
amendments that every classification based on age is outlawed." ''
Significantly, only two of the justices, Justice Powel,2  joined by
Justice O'Connor, wrote to object to the concurrence of Justice Stevens
which had bluntly urged that National League of Cities be
overruled.237
227 Id. (footnote omitted).
228 Id. at 1068 (Burger, C.J., dissenting, joined by Powell, Rehnquist &
O'Connor, JJ.).
29 Id. at 1068-71.
230 See supra text accompanying notes 223-25.
2311 EEOC v. Wyoming, 103 S. Ct. at 1071 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
232 Id. at 1071-72.
233 Id. at 1072.
24 Id. at 1072-74.
235 Id. at 1074.
236 Id. at 1075 (Powell, J., joined by O'Connor, J., dissenting).
237 Id. at 1064 (Stevens, J., concurring).
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V. CONCLUSION
After Federal Energy Regulatory Commission v. Mississippi,28
the future of National League of Cities v. Usery 39 is unclear. Cer-
tainly FERC may read as a continuation of the Court's narrowing of
National League of Cities. The narrow majority of justices who voted
to uphold the statute in FERC, however, suggests the growing reluc-
tance of several justices to continue this trend. With one additional vote,
the four dissenters in FERC and EEOC v. Wyoming 2 40 would com-
mand a majority of the Court. Whether a future court will resuscitate
the tenth amendment analysis of National League of Cities in order to
substitute its economic judgments for those of Congress in a way remi-
niscent of the pre-1937 Court is an open question. Four of the justices
in FERC thought that case was akin to National League of Cities and
regarded the federal regulation as invalid.240 Four justices upheld the
federal regulation, but they also thought that National League of Cities
had been wrongly decided.24 2 Only one member of the Court thought
that both National League of Cities and FERC were correctly
decided.243
There is nothing inherently wrong with the judicial technique of
balancing interests to reach a decision when that balancing leads to
some definable rule or test. When, however, the purported balancing
fails to yield any principle that will facilitate the understanding and
guide the actions of lower courts, we are left merely with ipse dixits by
judicial Caliphs. Henry Hart noted long ago that in the end:
[I]pse dixits are futile as instruments for the exercise of "the
judicial Power of the United States." As such, they settle lit-
tle or nothing more than the case in hand, and attempted
rationalizations of them serve more often to create than to
relieve doubts in other cases ...
. . . Only opinions which are grounded in reason and
not on mere fiat or precedent can do the job which the Su-
preme Court of the United States has to do . . . [because
that Court does not] have the power either in theory or in
practice to ram its own personal preferences down other peo-
2- 456 U.S. 742 (1982).
29 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
240 103 S. Ct. 1054, 1068 (1983).
241 The four were Chief Justice Burger and Justices Powell, Rehnquist, and
O'Connor.
24 The four were Justices Brennan, White, Marshall, and Stevens who joined the
FERC majority and dissented in National League of Cities.
"3 This was, of course, Justice Blackmun.
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ple's throats.2 44
The decision in National League of Cities precipitated precisely
this situation. Lower courts and commentators could not decipher the
message of the High Court. Confusion reigned until the Court provided
some clarification in Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining and Reclama-
tion Association, Inc.2 45 and United Transportation Union v. Long Is-
land Rail Road.246 Yet, given the frail majority in FERC and the fact
that parts of the Court's opinion were written quite narrowly, the pos-
sibility exists that one justice may simply change his or her mind on
slightly different facts.247 In many ways the Court seems to have re-
gressed to the chaotic period immediately following National League of
Cities.
To add to this confusion, some commentators have already inter-
preted FERC unusually narrowly. FERC is correctly read as holding
that Congress may impose conditions upon continuation of state regula-
tion in any field that is federally preemptible. As such, FERC usefully
limits National League of Cities. The latter case is distinguishable from
FERC simply because no such conditional preemption was involved.
Yet one commentator has, surprisingly, argued that such an interpreta-
tion of FERC would be misleading and would, in effect, overrule Na-
tional League of Cities.2" 8 One report of his views indicates that he
believes that the FERC Court actually only meant that:
state agencies may be required to settle disputes about fed-
eral regulations that are analogous to those state disputes
they already handle and to consider (not adopt) federal pro-
posals in accord with federal procedures that simply broaden
participation a bit beyond that prescribed by state proce-
dures, because such conditions are both minimally intrusive
and fully consistent with federalism's underlying value of
broader local participation in government.4 9
'" Hart, supra note 201, at 98-99.
452 U.S. 264 (1981).
246 455 U.S. 678 (1982).
' See FERC, 456 U.S. at 747-48. If the statute had provided for penalties or had
required the state to adopt federal standards, would the case come out differently for
Blackmun? Surely Congress ought to be able to say: adopt these federal standards or
the federal government will preempt the area. As Justice Blackmun did state in one
portion of his opinion, "[slo long as the field is preemptible-the nature of the condi-
tion is [ir]relevant." Id. at 767 n.30.
148 See Supreme Court Review and Constitutional Law Symposium, 51 U.S.L.W.
2248 (Oct. 26, 1982) (reporting a speech made by Professor Tribe).
24 Id. (emphasis in original). See also Tribe, Federal-State Relations, in 4 J.
CHOPER, Y. KAMISAR, & L. TRIBE, THE SUPREME CouRT: TRENDS AND DEvELop-
MENrS 1981-1982, at 167 (1983).
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This view of the decision reflects more of the O'Connor dissent than
the majority analysis.
A proper reading of FERC significantly cabins National League
of Cities. Basically, National League of Cities stafids for the limited
proposition that federal law cannot eliminate the states, set the salary of
the state governor and other somewhat similar state workers, or move
the state capital. If Congress can preempt an area of regulation, the
proper reading of FERC allows it instead to condition the state's con-
tinued participation and involvement in the area on state acceptance of
the federal requirements. 5" The interpretations of congressional power
expressed in the dissenting opinions in FERC and EEOC v. Wyoming
differ radically from those of the majority. The FERC and EEOC v.
Wyoming dissents invite the Court to return to its pre-1937 legacy and,
in the guise of constitutional analysis, invalidate economic policy with
which it disagrees.
As Justice Blackmun recognized in FERC, the doctrine of condi-
tional preemption provides a principled justification for congressional
exercises of the commerce power that may be seen by some as infring-
ing on the traditional domain of state governments. Rather than re-
turning to ad hoc review of economic legislation, which invites judicial
encroachment on the policymaking role of the legislative branch, the
Court should follow the course staked out by the doctrine of conditional
preemption. Such a course is consistent with the requirements of the
Constitution, ensures carefully deliberated federal decisionmaking by
250 Professor Tribe's reasoning was described as follows:
If the federal government may tell the states how to conduct their govern-
mental activities so long as the field of law is one which Congress could
substantively pre-empt at will, then it could require the states to pay their
highway commissioners and toll-takers a federal minimum wage as a con-
dition of operating state highways, inasmuch as Congress could surely
pre-empt all highway operations. Yet that intrusion into state sovereignty
was the very one that National League of Cities struck down.
51 U.S.L.W. at 2248. However the hypothetical instruction is quite different from that
which existed in National League of Cities: in National League of Cities there was no
conditional preemption, while in the hypothetical (as in FERC) there is. As long as the
federal government is committed to take over a preemptible area of governance under
the terms it sets for the states, the decision made at the federal level should be well-
considered and the scheme of regulation consistent with the federalism of the United
States Constitution.
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the intrinsic characteristics of the regulation it allows, and provides
meaningful guidance to lower courts that must analyze future cases.

